Ret to CA 306.11

OFFICE OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
MAR 9 - 1953
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Use this date

Op-3020/jmt
Ser 000222P30

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Modification of the Directive to CINCPAC concerning his responsibilities with respect to Formosa (JCS 1259/277 - Memo by Chief of Staff, U.S. Army)

Encl: (1) Comment on Modified Operational Instructions to CINCPAC

1. Enclosure (1) hereto contains my comment showing in detail what is involved in each of the modified operational instructions to the Commander in Chief, Pacific. Paragraph numbers in the enclosure correspond to the paragraph numbering in the Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army on this subject.

Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs
Department of State

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SECURITY INFORMATION

Bureau of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

ENCLOSURE (1)

COMMENT ON MODIFIED OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO CINCFAC

(Paragraph numbers correspond to paragraph numbering in Memorandum by Chief of Staff Army entitled "Modification of the Directive to CINCFAC concerning his responsibilities with respect to Formosa)

3. g. (1) "Conduct aerial reconnaissance of the coastal areas of China."

COMMENT:

Aerial reconnaissance of the coastal areas of China is now being conducted, in accordance with the present directive to CINCFAC (Subpara 6 D, JCS 92666). Forces now being employed are:

a. One squadron sea based patrol planes, normally tender based at Pescadores, but occasionally operating from Okinawa or Sangley Pt.

b. One squadron land based patrol planes normally based at Okinawa.

c. Occasional high speed photo reconnaissance by carrier based jet aircraft.

The present directive (subpara 6 D, JCS 92666) limits reconnaissance to areas south of the 32nd parallel and north of Hong Kong.

A requirement exists for occasional photo reconnaissance sweeps south of Hong Kong, and over portions of the Shanghai airfield complex north of the 32nd parallel. Under the present directive CINCFAC obtains special permission from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the occasion of each reconnaissance sweep south of Hong Kong and north of the 32nd parallel. In addition he coordinates with CINCFE on the occasion of a sweep in the vicinity of the 32nd parallel, since by mutual agreement between CINCFE and CINCFAC, the 32nd parallel is the boundary between the two commanders for these operations.

The modified directive (see subpara 3.g.(1) of memo by C/S Army) retains, in effect, the 32nd parallel as the northern limit of the area to be reconnoitered by CINCFAC, unless this limit is changed by mutual agreement between CINCFAC and CINCFE.

The effect of the modification is to eliminate the necessity for CINCFAC making a special request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the requirement exists for reconnaissance of the China coast outside the area between Hong Kong and the 32nd parallel.

No additional personnel, equipment or cost are involved.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

3. g. (2) "Base on Formosa, U.S. patrol and reconnaissance aircraft and establish thereon the necessary communications, maintenance and supply facilities essential to meet the operational requirements of these aircraft."

COMMENT:

This involves moving the land base patrol squadron, referred to under 3.g.(1) above, now based on Okinawa, together with its associated communications, maintenance and supply facilities, to an existing base on Formosa.

In this connection it should be noted that subpara 3.g.(3) of the modified directive states that Chinese Nationalist facilities and personnel will be utilized to the maximum. Further, the implementing instructions referred to in para 5 of the modified directive, and contained in Enclosure "B", JCS 1259/277, para 4, pages 1454 and 1455, provide for the necessary informal prior arrangements with the GRC, and expresses the intent that existing Chinese Nationalist facilities will be used to the maximum extent possible and that the U.S. will not finance any major base construction.

A total of 10 Chinese Nationalist air bases, suitable for patrol plane operations, are now in existence on Formosa. It is hoped and reasonably to be expected that arrangements could be made with the Chinese Nationalists for use of one of these bases, with minor cost to the United States Government.

Offsetting to some degree any cost involved in the move would be the saving in time and fuel which would be effected by basing this patrol squadron on Formosa instead of Okinawa. Considerable percentage of total patrol plane time and fuel is now expended proceeding to and from patrol stations in the Formosa Straits from the base in Okinawa.

In the past the Chinese Nationalist Air Defense Control Center has experienced some difficulty in identifying U.S. patrol aircraft in the vicinity, causing false air alerts. This situation is now improved, but further improvement in liaison between U.S. and CNAF forces would result from the basing of a U.S. operating element in Formosa.

Existing JCS policy (JCS 92666 subpara 6 B (2)) permits staging aircraft through Formosan bases, but does not permit basing forces in Formosa without specific authority of the JCS.

3.a. (3) "~~establish~~ Use of anchorages in Formosa and the Pescadores."

NOTE: Preferred wording. The anchorages are already established.

COMMENT:

No change from present practice intended. Anchorages in Formosa and Pescadores are authorized by present directive (JCS 92666, subpara 6 E).

3.a. (4) "Prepare to base combat aircraft to the extent of three or more jet squadrons on Formosa and the Pescadores; such preparations will include the establishment now of communications, maintenance and supply facilities including prestockage, essential to meet the operational requirements of those aircraft."

COMMENT:

The present directive (JCS 92666, subpara 6 E (2)) permits staging aircraft through Formosa and limited prestockage of petroleum, oil, lubricants and ammo.

As stated in para 13, page 1462, JCS 1259/277, U.S. air action to defend Formosa may well demand that Formosan airfields be used for operations more extended than is implied by the term staging. Should the Chinese Communists conduct an air attack against Formosa it is probable that they would launch the maximum number of aircraft available in a sudden attack. Facilities in place for the operation of U.S. jet aircraft would permit such aircraft as were in the adjacent areas to be used at once to assist in the defense of Formosa. The new directive would permit, subject to assignment of forces by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the temporary basing of such jet aircraft as were available, on Formosa, for the duration of their employment in the defense of Formosa.

In addition to limited prestockage of petroleum, oil, lubricants and ammo, the modified directive would permit prior installation of essential communication facilities and prestockage of other necessary supplies such as radio and aircraft spare parts. It would also permit the establishment of ambere maintenance and supply facilities. The new directive, however, requires that Chinese Nationalist facilities and personnel will be utilized to the maximum. The extent to which erection of U.S. facilities would be required would be dependent upon the availability of suitable Chinese Nationalist facilities, and the outcome of the informal negotiations with the Chinese Nationalists concerning use of these facilities by U.S. forces.

A total of four Chinese Nationalist air bases, suitable for jet fighter operations, are now in existence on Formosa. It is hoped and reasonably to be expected that arrangements can be made with the Chinese Nationalists for use of about three of these bases for U.S. jet aircraft operations in defense of Formosa in event of attack. It is expected that after preliminary discussions with the MAAG, CINCFAE would survey existing CHINAT air bases and facilities, determine the extent to which additional facilities would be required for operation of U.S. jet aircraft, and submit the requirements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Since it is not the intent to base permanently jet fighter aircraft on Formosa, it is anticipated that the requirements would be modest. Through MAAG channels, the CHINAT would be encouraged to erect such facilities of their own for the operation and maintenance of currently programmed MAAP jet fighters as to minimize the need for additional facilities to accomodate U.S. jet fighters for short periods of time.

The cost of erecting on an austere basis the necessary facilities for operating 3 jet squadrons, and the prestockage of necessary supplies, are shown in the Appendix to this Enclosure. These figures are supplied to give an indication of the cost in the event that no CHINAT facilities (other than airstrips) are made available for U.S. use. Since prestockage of POL and ammo are already authorized by the present directive, POL and ammo are excluded from the computations in the Appendix.

3.a (5) "Station on Formosa and the Pescadores the U.S. ground combat personnel required to maintain the internal security of the bases authorized herein."

COMMENT:

In addition to the employment of Chinese Nationalist internal security personnel, it would be desirable to provide a minimum number of U.S. personnel to guard against pilferage the ammo dumps, fuel storages and any communication, maintenance and supply facilities established. The number of U.S. personnel required would depend upon the number and nature of facilities established, which in turn would depend upon the outcome of the discussions with the CHINAT and the extent to which existing CHINAT facilities can be utilized.

3.a.(6) "Coordinate with the MAAG the plans prepared in connection with paragraph 2 and paragraph 4.b. of this message."

COMMENT:

Present JCS policy (JCS 92666, subpara 6 E) states that development of such plans will not be disclosed to any non-United States personnel.

If CINCPAC's plans for the defense of Formosa are to be most effective, they must be coordinated with the Chinese Nationalists who will be responsible for the ground defense of the island.

If CINCPAC's plans for offensive participation of CHINAT forces, in the accomplishment of missions assigned him, are to be realistic, they should be coordinated with the Chinese Nationalists. Coordination of offensive plans with ROC will insure that the plans are in accord with U.S. policy and within the ROC capabilities.

3.a. (7) "Conduct informal discussions with the ROC on the subject of command relationships with a view to obtaining at least a tacit agreement to U.S. command of combined forces in an emergency."

COMMENT:

To facilitate planning and particularly in connection with combined training, I consider that this matter should be discussed with a view to obtaining at least a tacit understanding now.

3.a. (8) "Conduct combined training with ROC forces."

COMMENT:

The first few days in the battle for Formosa may be critical. Both U.S. and Chinese Nationalist ships and aircraft will be operating in defense of Formosa. Regardless of the extent of coordination of plans, confusion is likely to result in the critical first stages of an emergency if U.S. and Chinese Nationalist personnel, particularly aircraft pilots and communication personnel, have not had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with local conditions and operations through combined training exercises. Exercises for the familiarization of communication and air personnel will probably be undertaken first, then other exercises will be worked out as the need therefor develops in the process of developing coordinated plans.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE (1)

Cost of Preparations to Base Three Jet Squadrons on Tarawa

In the event no Atoll facilities can be made available, other than a suitably surfaced strip and adjoining area for temporary facilities, the provision of communications, maintenance, supply facilities, and pre storage of limited quantities of supply items, other than POL and ammunition, would serve the needs for temporary basing or staging 3 squadrons of jet aircraft. Communications facilities would have to include a tower and airfield control system and the necessary command, administration, and backbone communications facilities. Maintenance and supply facilities of a temporary expeditionary nature could be provided especially under hangar and/or in a limited number of temporary buildings. Prolonged use of hangar might be less expensive than the hotel than the initial installation of temporary buildings but is such but replacement of canvas. The cost and maintenance of pre-stored supply items and the placement of ship equipment and assignment of motor vehicle equipment would not necessarily represent an additional investment if administrative shipping is combined with the expeditionary allowance already on hand. Shelter and housing facilities for the personnel involved would be provided for. After the facilities are established it is estimated that a core force of approximately 100 personnel should be permanently based at the location during periods of inactivity. Requisition to implement all services required would be necessary to support active operations. Based from Central equipment personnel, it is estimated that this organization would require approximately 450 personnel to support from 3 jet squadrons. The capital cost of equipment to provide the foregoing facilities is estimated as follows:

(a) Communications facilities	$500,000
(b) Maintenance & Supply facilities	400,000
(c) Pre-Storage (less ammo & POL)	400,000
(d) Equipment & Shelter	[illegible]
Total	$2,[illegible],000

Operation of the foregoing facilities could require funding in the order of $[illegible],000 per quarter in an idle status and about $[illegible],000 monthly per squadron while operational.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION